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Background: Global health programs, as supported by organizations such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), stand to make significant
contributions to international medical outcomes. Traditional systems of monitoring and evaluation, however, fail to
capture downstream, indirect, or collateral advantages (and threats) of intervention selection, design, and
implementation from broader donor perspectives, including those of the diplomatic and foreign policy
communities, which these programs also generate. This paper describes the development a new métier under
which assessment systems designed to consider the diplomatic value of global health initiatives are described and
applied based on previously-identified “Top Ten” criteria.
Methods: The “Kevany Riposte” and the “K-Score” were conceptualized based on a retrospective and collective
assessment of the author’s participation in the design, implementation and delivery of a range of global health
interventions related to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Responses and associated scores reframe intervention worth or
value in terms of global health diplomacy criteria such as “adaptability”, “interdependence”, “training,” and
“neutrality”. Response options ranged from “highly advantageous” to “significant potential threat”.
Results: Global health initiatives under review were found to generate significant advantages from the diplomatic
perspective. These included (1) intervention visibility and associations with donor altruism and prestige, (2) development
of international non-health collaborations and partnerships, (3) adaptability and responsiveness of service delivery to local
needs, and (4) advancement of broader strategic goals of the international community. Corresponding threats included
(1) an absence of formal training of project staff on broader political and international relations roles and responsibilities,
(2) challenges to recipient cultural and religious practices, (3) intervention-related environmental concerns, and (4) a lack
of prima facie consideration of intervention diplomatic and foreign policy consequences.
Conclusions: Global health interventions stand to generate significant diplomatic advantages for donor and recipient
countries and organizations when appropriately selected, designed, targeted, and delivered. Conversely, in the absence
of the application of standards such as those developed under the Kevany Riposte, threats to diplomacy and
international relations may occur. With the application of related systems to other global health programmes and
settings, comparative results on the relative worth of alternate approaches from the diplomatic perspective may be
generated to better inform political, strategic, and global health policy and programmatic decisions.
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Global health, diplomacy, and foreign policy
Foreign policy trends in both the European Union and
the United States are increasingly aligned with “smart
power” [1] approaches, in recognition of the “myriad
newer uses” of global health and development initiatives
[2]. The European Union advocates strategic use of for-
eign assistance, combined with diplomacy and arbitra-
tion, to pursue foreign policy goals under the Common
Foreign & Security Policy [3,4] via a specific focus on
global health [5]. Similarly, in the United States, increas-
ing levels of alignment between the State Department,
the United States Agency for International Development,
the Department of Defense and the Department of Health
and Human Services is indicative of their increasingly
interchangeable roles [6]. In the United Kingdom, foreign
assistance now forms an integral component of foreign af-
fairs [7] under the stated goal of “policy coherence” [8].
Conversely but convergently, both the United Nations and
international military forces have displayed an increased
propensity to combine conflict resolution and humanitar-
ian activities [9], whilst the World Bank has recommended
that international development focus on security issues
beyond primary programmatic goals [10]. These trends
are of increasing importance to the design, delivery and
evaluation of global health intervention programs under
initiatives such as the United States’ President’s Emer-
gency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) [11] particularly in
the context of the recent creation of the Office of Global
Health Diplomacy [12] and related programs supported
by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (“The Global Fund”) [13].
Aligning & sensitizing global health programs to
international affairs
Unlike the medically-dominated ethos of global health,
diplomatic and foreign policy perspectives are both multi-
level and multicausal, involving the synthesis of informa-
tion from a variety of social science knowledge systems
[14]. Failure to consider foreign policy and international
relations principles and objectives when designing, select-
ing and implementing global health programs such as
PEPFAR and the Global Fund’s related HIV/AIDS initia-
tives may, therefore, create a “tense and confusing duality”
[15]. For example, while global health programs that chal-
lenge cultural, religious, ideological, social and behavioral
norms are often compelling in terms of their capacity to
achieve primary health outcomes, they may also create
unquantified downstream benefits, or constitute potential
liabilities, from the diplomatic and foreign policy perspec-
tives. Although it is critically important for such initiatives
to attempt to optimize outcomes such as quality-adjusted
life years (QALYs), their design and delivery needs to be
carefully evaluated in order to ensure that (1) these goalsare not being achieved at the cost of foreign policy, diplo-
matic, international relations, or broader global strategic
objectives, and (2) their potential to achieve such collateral
objectives is optimized [16].
Ranking global health programs from the foreign policy
and diplomatic perspectives
The rise of a utilitarian approach to global health evalu-
ation, as represented by tools such as cost-effectiveness
analysis, has resulted in the predominant use of narrow,
single-metric measures as exclusive barometers of global
health program worth or value [17]. No international ini-
tiative, however, operates in isolation or without epistemic
consequences [18]. In a variation on the McNamara
Fallacy [19], such programs produce a range of down-
stream, collateral or indirect outcomes that are not ad-
equately quantified – and, therefore, considered to be
non-existent. In the 21st century, both foreign policy-
makers and global health professionals require an innova-
tive métier that reflects these broader considerations, both
(1) in order to portray global health expenditures as in-
vestments rather than costs, and (2) to “speak a language
that people with power really understand” [20]; foreign as-
sistance priorities and associated resource allocation deci-
sions should, where possible, include consideration of the
universal and fundamental aspirations of global political,
security, and strategic affairs [21]. The recent emergence
of the smart power paradigm [22] has, at least in part,
been a product of this increased integration between for-
eign policy and global health initiatives [23], elevating glo-
bal health to the status of a powerful diplomatic and
foreign policy tool, rather than merely a humanitarian ef-
fort. There has been, to date, a “lack of ability” to demon-
strate the effectiveness of foreign assistance programs in
this context [24]. This paper outlines the development
and application of just such a “diplomatic assessment” ap-
proach for global health programmes, adopting a term
from the art of fencing, and eponymously entitled the
Kevany Riposte, due to it’s conceptual basis as an innova-
tive and interdisciplinary approach that challenges “siloed”
[13] or “stovepiped” [25] perspectives. These efforts are
based on the author’s prior identification of “Top Ten”
lists for diplomatic effectiveness [25], and as applied to a
retrospective and collective assessment of PEPFAR and
Global Fund-supported HIV/AIDS initiatives in South
Africa, Sudan, Kenya, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Tanzania,
Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, and elsewhere, in order, for the
first time, to assess intervention program threats and ad-
vantages from this broader perspective.
Methods
Defining “HIV/AIDS initiatives”
Community-based behavioral, educational, and diagnos-
tic initiatives form an innovative and essential part of
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paradigms [26,27]. Such programs provide, amongst other
features, technical assistance to strengthen prevention
programming; community support mechanisms; referral
systems; and other behavioral and community-based
health promotion and educational initiatives [28]. Within
this broader operational context, HIV Counseling & Test-
ing (HCT) based around “wellness days”, “community
mobilization”, and “post-test support services”, amongst
other forms of service delivery, are provided in commu-
nity venues in order to increase, for example, numbers of
persons tested for HIV/AIDS provided with personalized
support and guidance regarding behavioral risk-reduction,
as well as raising community awareness and engagement.
In the health systems strengthening context, related inter-
ventions also contribute to capacity building (e.g. the
provision of district-level trainers to implement “Preven-
tion with Positives” programs) [29]. For the purposes of
this paper, “HIV/AIDS interventions”, “HIV/AIDS pro-
grammes”, and “HIV/AIDS initiatives” therefore refer to
such community-based, multi-level HIV/AIDS responses,
including combined diagnostic, prevention, behavioural,
and health system strengthening programs under the
auspices of Project Accept [30], the Global Fund, and
PEPFAR South Africa [31], whilst excluding therapeutic
programs such as antiretroviral treatment and surgical
interventions such as voluntary adult male circumcision.
Kevany Riposte and K-Score development
Systems by which to quantify the latent and potential glo-
bal health diplomacy and foreign policy value of global
health programmes were developed based on previously-
identified criteria for “global health diplomacy” and “global
health and foreign policy” appropriateness and effective-
ness in global health program design, delivery and
evaluation [32]. Originally presented in the form of two
“Top Ten” tables – representative of those features or
characteristics of global health programs identified as
effective in the foreign policy or diplomatic contexts,
respectively, in the related literature – classifications were
adapted to Excel-based questionnaire and scoring formats
(see Additional file 1 Annex 1: Diplomatic Assessment
Questionnaire and Scoring Tool). Development of the
Kevany Riposte and K-Score also drew on the author’s
prior contributions to the development and utilization of
related designs, in particular the Global Fund’s Routine
Service Quality Assessment (RSQA) and On-Site Data
Verification (OSDV) tools [33]. The results presented in
this paper relate specifically to “diplomatic”, rather than
“foreign policy”, considerations.
Implementation & utilization
Diplomatic assessments of HIV/AIDS initiatives were
based on the retrospective and collective assessment ofthe author’s field deployments for diplomatic monitoring
& evaluation, cost-effectiveness, and quality assurance
purposes on behalf of the Global Fund, the United
Nations Development Program, PEPFAR implementing
organizations (e.g. the International Training and Educa-
tion Center for Health), the University of California, San
Francisco, and the Project Accept community-based vol-
untary counseling and testing intervention (as imple-
mented under the United States’ National Institutes for
Mental Health) between 2007 and 2014. Related on-site
engagements included field missions to service delivery
points (e.g. mobile HIV/AIDS counseling and testing cen-
ters in the Northwest Province of South Africa for PEP-
FAR and in Sudan and South Sudan for the Global Fund)
and engagements and liaisons with key governmental and
non-governmental organizations and individuals (e.g. the
South African, Sudanese and South Sudanese Ministries
of Health on behalf of the Global Fund). Field-level and
on-site observations conducted to inform assessment re-
sponses were undertaken, where possible, with the assist-
ance of an interview guide (see Additional file 2 Annex 2:
Interview and Assessment Guide for Diplomatic and For-
eign Policy Assessments) and were complemented, where
necessary, by follow-up questions via e-mail exchanges
and teleconferences with key managerial and field staff.
Further on-site and desk research (e.g. review of interven-
tion protocols and standard operating procedures) was
also conducted to complete remaining questionnaire re-
sponses, as necessary.
Defining assessment classifications & sub-classifications
The primary classifications employed in the Kevany
Riposte and K-Score were based directly on previously-
identified “Top Ten” criteria keywords (e.g. “communi-
cations”; “adaptability”), as described above. Related
sub-classifications were based on interpretations and
descriptions of each primary classification in the literature
(e.g. the “adaptability” classification was associated with
themes of “responsiveness to health needs”, “responsive-
ness to non-health needs”, “recipient-led program design”,
and “recipient-led resource allocation”). For purposes of
both detail and consistency, four such sub-classifications
were developed for each classification, resulting in 40 as-
sessment questions. In turn, these sub-classifications were
expanded and articulated in the form of specific thematic
questions to be addressed to relevant project staff, includ-
ing program managers, field officers, and other project
personnel, designed to be relevant to project activities at
the individual, intervention and policy levels (see below).
Policy, intervention and individual level assessment
dimensions
As a result of the broad range of issues related to the
diplomatically-effective delivery of global health programs,
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eration of three main evaluation dimensions: (1) policy
level (e.g. whether donor organization guidelines addressed
relevant practices & procedures), (2) intervention level (e.g.
whether intervention protocol and standard operating pro-
cedures were appropriately designed from the diplomatic
perspective), and (3) individual level performance and re-
sponsibilities (e.g. sensitization of national and international
project staff to consideration of broader local, national, and
international strategic environments). Sub-classification
questions were designed to be informed by, and completed
based on consideration of, these three constructs.
Responses, scoring and comments
Response options to sub-classification questions were
divided into six categories: “highly advantageous”, “moder-
ately advantageous”, “neutral, not relevant, or not consid-
ered”, “not applicable”, “potential moderate threat”, and
“potential significant threat”, in accordance with level of
alignment with associated diplomatic goals and principles
(Table 1). These response categories were associated with
scores of +2, +1, zero (for both “neutral, not relevant, or
not considered” and “not applicable”), -1, and -2, respect-
ively. Sub-classification scores were then aggregated and
averaged in order to provide an overall classification score.
No weighting was attached to different classifications or
sub-classifications, based on the assumption that all classi-
fications were of equal value or importance from the dip-
lomatic perspective. Scope for additional comments,
narrative descriptions, and categorization justification was
also included at the assessment and evaluation stage in
order to provide further explanation, as necessary, for
scoring decisions. Finally, all classification scores were ag-
gregated and averaged in order to determine an overall
intervention-specific diplomatic assessment rating, repre-
sentative of the collective programs under review, in the
diplomatic context (the “K-Score”).
Program performance from the diplomatic
perspective
Overall diplomatic assessment results
Diplomatic assessment ratings at the classification and
sub-classification levels are presented in Table 2 andTable 1 Scoring and Results Classifications for “Top Ten” Criteria
Classification Interpretation
Highly advantageous Intervention program displays clear and signific
Moderately advantageous Intervention program displays some strengths i
Acceptable, neutral, or not
relevant
Intervention attains diplomatic or foreign polic
Not applicable Intervention program does not operate in the c
Potential moderate threat Intervention program may constitute a threat t
Potential significant treat Intervention program constitutes a clear and siAdditional file 1 Annex 1. The HIV/AIDS initiatives
under review were collectively found to be “moderately
advantageous” from the diplomatic perspective, attain-
ing an overall average score of +1 across diplomatic as-
sessment classifications. This included three “highly
advantageous”, three “moderately advantageous”, one
“neutral”, and three “potential moderate threat” classifi-
cation scores (Fig. 1).
“Highly advantageous” classifications
HIV/AIDS initiatives were considered to be “highly advan-
tageous” under the diplomatic assessment classifications
of “visibility”, “adaptability”, and “partnerships”. These re-
sults are in keeping with prior findings related to both the
structure and “unintended consequences” of HIV/AIDS
intervention programs [18]. For example, the extensive
intervention adaptability of related HIV/AIDS interven-
tions has been documented elsewhere [34], including the
importance of intervention visibility and communications
through revisions to key practices (e.g. evolving interven-
tion “branding” and terminology to fit with local cultures
and social norms) and community mobilization activities.
Similarly, the generation of international partnerships
through collaborations based on international HIV/
AIDS initiatives is in keeping with prior findings related
to the documented success of academic and inter-
governmental collaborations under both the Global
Fund and PEPFAR [35].
“Moderately advantageous” classifications
HIV/AIDS initiatives under review were found to be “mod-
erately advantageous”, from the diplomatic perspective, in
terms of “sustainability”, “accountability”, and “economic,
political, environmental and social effects”. These findings
are also supported by reference to related studies. For ex-
ample, positive assessments for sustainability were driven
by intervention strengths in the context of “country owner-
ship” [36] and transferability to local actors, while diplo-
matic advantages in the “accountability” context are aligned
with previously-documented strengths of PEPFAR and the
Global Fund in monitoring and evaluation and other qual-
ity assurance and control systems [37]. Similarly, positive
economic, political, and social outcomes were driven by theScore
ant value from the diplomatic or foreign policy perspective. +2
n advancing diplomatic or foreign policy goals. +1
y minimum standards. 0
ontext of this classification (or sub-classification). 0
o diplomatic or foreign policy goals. −1
gnificant threat from the diplomatic or foreign policy perspective. −2
Table 2 Diplomatic Assessment Results
Classification Sub-classification 1 Sub-classification 2 Sub-classification 3 Sub-classification 4 Score Rating
Neutrality Cultural Social Religious Other
Neutrality Score −1 −1 −2 2 −1 POTENTIAL
MODERATE THREAT
Visibility Appropriate Branding Safety & Security National Linkages Visibility through
Communications
Visibility Score 2 1 1 2 2 HIGHLY
ADVANTAGEOUS
Sustainability Sustainability Transferability Intervention Type Forward-Looking
Commitments
Sustainability Score −2 1 2 2 1 MODERATELY
ADVANTAGEOUS
Effectiveness Effectiveness Constrained
Budgets
Cost-Effectiveness Academic Evidence
Effectiveness Score 2 −1 −2 2 0 NEUTRAL
Adaptability Responsiveness to
Health Needs
Responsiveness to
Non-Health Needs
Recipient-Led
Program Design
Recipient-Led Resource
Allocation
Adaptability Score 1 2 2 2 2 HIGHLY
ADVANTAGEOUS
Accountability Contributions to
M&E Systems
Production of
Verifiable Results
Presentation of Health
& Non-Health
Achievements
Combating Corruption and
Increasing Transparency
Accountability Score 2 2 1 −1 1 MODERATELY
ADVANTAGEOUS
Partnerships Reference to Standards of
International Interaction
Building
International
Alliances
Interaction
Coordinating
Initiatives
Sub-National Partnerships
Partnerships Score 0 2 2 2 2 HIGHLY
ADVANTAGEOUS
Economic, Political,
Environmental and
Social (EPES) Effects
Economic Growth Political Stability Social Evolution Environmental Impact
EPES Effects Score 2 1 2 −2 1 MODERATELY
ADVANTAGEOUS
Interdependence Organizational
Relationships
Staff Safety Mission Statements Joint Agenda
Accomplishment
Interdependence
Score
−1 0 −1 −1 −1 POTENTIAL
MODERATE THREAT
Training Staff Selection Staff Recognition Education on
Strategic Themes
Diplomatic Risks
and Benefits
Training Score −2 1 −1 −1 −1 POTENTIAL
MODERATE THREAT
Overall K-Score &
Assessment
1 MODERATELY
ADVANTAGEOUS
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vices (such as “Back to Work” or income-generating horti-
cultural schemes), which were frequently attached to those
primary service delivery components under review [30].
“Neutral” classifications
HIV/AIDS interventions were classified as “neutral” from
the diplomatic perspective in the context of “effective-
ness”. The limited consideration of budgetary constraintsafter the intervention or programmatic support period,
combined with the high demand for affordable and cost-
effective health care delivery and financing strategies in re-
cipient countries, are current causes of concern through-
out both the global health and international development
contexts [38], most particularly in the current global re-
cession era. In this context, the increased use of both
health and non-health effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
information as a key component of intervention design
Fig. 1 Diplomatic Advantages & Threats of Selected HIV/AIDS Initiatives
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may significantly strengthen intervention design and deliv-
ery [39] in this regard.
“Potential moderate threat” classifications
Potential moderate threats to diplomatic considerations,
interests and outcomes at both recipient and donor
levels related to “neutrality”, “interdependence”, and
“training”. These findings are, once again, in keeping
with a range of contemporary recommendations on the
design and delivery of global health intervention pro-
grams. For example, in the context of neutrality, the im-
position of international cultural, social and religious
standards and norms on recipient societies, often with-
out appropriate levels of consultation at the local and
community levels, may represent a threat both to suc-
cessful program implementation and to international re-
lations [34]. Conversely, a lack of awareness of the
strategic implications of global health’s resource alloca-
tion decisions may mean that foreign assistance can un-
intentionally support extremist organizations [40].
Similarly, in the context of “interdependence”, a lack of
organizational and operational coordination and align-
ment between health and non-health initiatives related to
broader strategic and international affairs considerations
has been identified as a possible source of conflict between
health and diplomatic goals [41]. Finally, in the context of
“training”, limited levels of broader political education and
awareness in global health practitioners operating in inter-
national environments has been identified as a key gap at
the individual capacity level [42,43].
Potential significant threats at the sub-classification level
Although no classifications were rated as a “potential sig-
nificant threat” from the diplomatic perspective, specific
sub-classifications recording this result are highlighted
here. These include programmatic threats to religious
neutrality (under the “neutrality” classification), limitedassurances and planning regarding funding sustainability
(under the “sustainability” classification), limited or no
prima facie use of health and non-health cost-effectiveness
findings (under the “effectiveness” classification, and as
described above), limited or no consideration of envir-
onmental impact (under the “economic, political, environ-
mental and social effects” classification), and inadequate
provision of broader diplomatic training, awareness, and
formalization of related roles and responsibilities (under
the “training” classification). Strategies to address these
potentially significant diplomatic threats have been pre-
sented, in recent years, via innovative recommendations
on the 21st century design and delivery of global health
service delivery [13].Interpretation & conclusions
Key findings
For the first time, a global health intervention has been
assessed through the lens, and from the perspective, of
diplomatic appropriateness, sensitivity and effectiveness.
HIV/AIDS initiatives were found to score positively in
terms of diplomatic effectiveness, whilst also evincing
both (1) potential areas of improvement and (2) a limited
number of potential diplomatic threats. These findings
may represent significant considerations for policymakers
both within and beyond global health, who are now
equipped to determine the value, worth or risk of global
health investments beyond the narrow metrics employed
by traditional monitoring and evaluation or cost-
effectiveness analyses associated with a narrow (and
often exclusively medical) selection of outcomes, out-
puts and impact assessments [44]. These results
should, nonetheless, still be considered in conjunction
with traditional measures of program effectiveness or
efficiency in order to determine associated resource
allocation and implementation decisions: low levels of
intervention cost-effectiveness, for example, may be
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the diplomatic level [35].
Enlightened strategic & resource allocation decisions:
beyond cost-effectiveness
The results presented here are designed for use and ref-
erence at both the global health policy level and across
the broader milieu of bilateral and multilateral foreign
policymaking and practice. For example, within global
health and development, these results may help to
inform “enlightened” resource allocation decisions be-
yond the “potentially flawed” [35] reliance on cost-
effectiveness analyses as the exclusive determinant of
global health program worth or value. Perhaps even
more importantly, the interpretation and use of these
results at the diplomatic and foreign policy level pre-
sents a range of opportunities for policymakers to le-
verage, design, and refine global health and other
development initiatives for the purposes of foreign pol-
icy and diplomacy [45].
“Smart power” and “smart global health”
At its most optimal, the Kevany Riposte and the K-Score
may help both health and non-health, bilateral and
multilateral organizations to manipulate aid in order to
substitute for, offset, complement, or support the use of
hard power in favour of smart power options, via the
creation of a new “stage” in the escalation of inter-
national engagements, in keeping with 21st Century
standards of acceptability for, and effectiveness of, inter-
national military interventions [46,47]. A new step in the
“escalation hierarchy” amongst traditional and accepted
stratifications such as neutrality, diplomacy, soft power
and hard power [48] would be epitomized by such smart
global health initiatives [45]. This may, in turn, bring
about (1) a transfer or collaboration of resources from
hard to smart international initiatives operating under
“military umbrellas” [46] and, where feasible and appro-
priate, (2) the increased or enhanced use by military
forces and related organizations of smart global health
systems to pursue foreign policy and strategic preroga-
tives [49].
Utilization in the international intelligence context
The employment of global health programs for strategic
political ends in an unstructured manner has, in the
past, put global health workers at a security risk by asso-
ciation, regardless of whether or not individual- or
organizational-level activities are in fact related to such
ostensibly extraneous objectives [50]. At the same time,
Western powers are increasingly open to the use of in-
novative, collaborative and interdisciplinary efforts to re-
solve contemporary international affairs and security
challenges [51], against which conventional responsesystems have faced significant challenges. In this highly
nuanced, complex, and occasionally clandestine context,
non-health dividends may be attained if global health
programs are selected, designed and delivered in a man-
ner that bears in mind potential international conflict
resolution, cooperation, and security goals as well as pri-
mary health and development outcomes [52]; past re-
search has suggested that locating highly-diplomatic
global health projects in extremist regions, as informed
by the “geo-strategic considerations” classification, pro-
vides meaningful alternatives to political or other forms
of extremism [53]. In this context, the Kevany Riposte
and the K-Score may offer standards by which inter-
national agencies such as the United Kingdom’s Security
Service,(MI5), the European Union’s Intelligence Ana-
lysis Centre [54], and the United States’ Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) liaise with both donor, supra-
national, and recipient departments of international de-
velopment and health in a fashion that both (1) reduces
threats to aid workers and (2) integrates multifarious di-
mensions to global health programs which are, in turn,
(3) conducted in a style acceptable and transparent to
recipient country governments. Such innovative collabo-
rations, instead of acquiescing to demands that global
health funding be transferred to defense [55], stand to
achieve both altruistic, intelligence, and security goals
simultaneously. Perhaps most importantly, employment
of assessment systems under the Kevany Riposte in this
context will also help to ensure that global health pro-
grams do not inadvertently harm international security
by providing aid, health, or other financial support to ex-
tremist organizations [56]. Notwithstanding these other
potential gains, traditional (and possibly flawed) ap-
proaches to intelligence gathering through international
development initiatives [57] stand to be both improved
and made more effective by the application of relevant
criteria, models, procedures and standards to both
organizational and individual-level activities and liaisons
in this context.
Limitations
The absence of comparator results from other global
health intervention programs is a key limitation of this
work. The generation of relevant comparable “K-Scores”
in different settings (e.g. the diplomatic effectiveness of
tuberculosis treatment programs in Iraq or malaria pre-
vention initiatives in Afghanistan, as described elsewhere
by the author) [17,52] may, as with the results of cost-
effectiveness analyses, generate opportunities for inter-
vention ranking or league tables [58] from the diplo-
matic or foreign policy perspective. For example,
comparisons with HIV/AIDS interventions excluded
from this review (e.g. antiretroviral treatment or male
circumcision) might provide useful information to
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cisions. This review should, therefore, be characterized
and interpreted as a pilot initiative, based on which, in fu-
ture, Kevany Riposte systems, scope, and results may be
further refined and applied by larger teams. In addition,
future efforts might also (1) consider dividing the system’s
structure and results across the three major evaluation di-
mensions outlined above (i.e. individual, policy and inter-
vention levels) in a more explicit fashion, (2) correlate
health and diplomatic outcomes (see below), and (3) at-
tempt to further describe the political and operational
mechanisms by which the results of diplomatic and for-
eign policy evaluations may be translated from findings
such as those presented here into policy, and thence into
practice [59–61] (see below).
Plotting health effectiveness against intervention
effectiveness
A related area of potential interest and inquiry to organi-
zations such as the United States’ Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) is consideration of the
effects of diplomatically “highly advantageous” global
health interventions on health outcomes. Do “more dip-
lomatic” global health interventions relate to improved
health outcomes – or vice versa – or both? Such find-
ings, though beyond the scope of this paper, might be
determined through cross-referencing intervention med-
ical efficacy and effectiveness against diplomatic assess-
ment values. Though direction of causality may be
challenging to prove, the establishment of such relation-
ships may help to further explain the manifold connec-
tions between diplomatically and medically successful
global health interventions [62].
Recommendations
Global health interventions and related Global Fund and
PEPFAR-supported programs have the potential to be of
significant importance in alleviating developing coun-
tries from the worst effects of communicable and non-
communicable disease and ill-health. More broadly, such
interventions may also have the potential to advance
diplomatic considerations related to the interests of both
donor and recipient countries, as well as national and
international, health and non-health, goals and initia-
tives, such as strategic and security concerns. In order to
optimize the potential future impact of these latter di-
mensions, and based on the results presented here, re-
lated recommendations include (1) consideration of the
redesign of HIV/AIDS initiatives in the context of train-
ing, organizational interdependence, and neutrality, whilst
also addressing the specific “potential significant threats”
at the sub-classification level described above; (2) the
further development of intervention sustainability, ac-
countability, and latent political, economic, social andenvironmental potential; (3) the development and
prima facie integration of intervention health and non-
health effectiveness findings into intervention program
design and delivery; (4) building on the successes and dip-
lomatic advantages associated with intervention visibility,
adaptability, and partnership development; and (5) lever-
aging these latent diplomatic assets, at the individual,
intervention and policy levels, in order to address broader
national and international strategic concerns.
Next steps: utilization of results and “evidence into policy
& practice”
The identification of five main opportunities and mecha-
nisms for utilization of the results of the Kevany Riposte
and K-Score have previously been identified by the author
as (1) training, (2) evaluation, (3) resource allocation, (4)
funding, and (5) military and international security consid-
erations [25]. A range of realpolitik scenarios for such ap-
plications are conceivable. In one possible example,
widespread diplomatic reviews conducted under the aus-
pices of organizations such as the Office of Global Health
Diplomacy, the United Kingdom’s Royal Institute for
International Affairs, or the European Union’s External
Action Service, might provide a detailed picture of the
comparative worth of global health interventions, from
the diplomatic and foreign policy perspectives, across a
range of key settings, population groups, and regions
around the world. These results might then be overlaid,
with the assistance of donor and recipient country foreign
policymakers or professional diplomats, with global diplo-
matic, political, foreign policy or strategic needs and
threats in order to determine both (1) overall and targeted
global health investments, (2) geo-strategic and demo-
graphic focus, and (3) intervention program selection,
whilst (4) better aligning interventions with broader stra-
tegic considerations and the work of non-health inter-
national initiatives and organizations. In this way, the
smart use of global health initiatives may provide a mean-
ingful and effective alternative or complement to other
forms of international intervention on the world stage, ad-
vancing both health and non-health goals [63].
Additional files
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